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1I.   Introduction
A general reduction of working hours  – i.e. the number of hours mandated by
law or collective bargaining agreements – as a means of reducing
unemployment has a long tradition in the economic policy debate in Germany
(see, e.g., Franz, 1984) and is also common in other European countries (OECD
1998, chapter 5).  The latest example, passed in January 2000, is the French
legal restriction of standard working hours to 35 hours as an attempt to reduce
unemployment.  In Germany, the dominant labor union, the metal workers union
(IG Metall), has proposed a further reduction of standard working time from
currently 35 to 32 or even 30 hours.  In this paper, we analyze the likely
employment effects of a further reduction in standard weekly hours in German1
manufacturing.
For various reasons it remains very controversial whether a reduction in
working hours is a suitable means to reduce unemployment (see, e.g., Dreze
1991, OECD 1994, Freeman 1998).  As shown in section III below, such a
policy will have both direct and indirect effects on the demand for labor. Given
real hourly wages and labor costs stay constant, a reduction in standard hours
changes the optimal mix between workers and hours (overtime). This direct
effect is ambiguous, i.e. employment may increase or decline. If the reduction of
working time leads to an increase in labor costs the demand for labor will be
reduced due to both substitution and scale effects.  An increase in labor costs is
likely to occur because unions and workers will try to prevent weekly (or
monthly) earnings to be reduced in proportion to the reduction in working time,
which is known as “Lohnausgleich” in German collective bargaining.  A general
                                          
1 Here and in the following, „Germany“ always refers to West Germany.  Standard
working hours in East Germany are still considerably higher than in West Germany.
Since the available time series data are too short and the labor market situation in East
Germany differs in various ways from the one in West Germany, we do not include East
Germany in our analysis here.
2reduction in standard hours would also restrict firms flexibility to adjust actual
working hours and may also lead to a ''mismatch'' of the firms’ demand for and
supply of labor by skill type.
For Germany, results from empirical studies (see König and Pohlmeier
1988, 1989, Lehment 1991 and Hunt 1998, 1999) suggest that the net effect of
working-time reductions tends to be negative with respect to the overall level of
employment.  For example, Hunt (1999) concludes that the general reduction of
standard hours in West German manufacturing has resulted in higher real hourly
wages for those who remained employed but this has been achieved at the price
of lower overall employment.  However, these studies do not try to disentangle
the various effects which make up the negative net effect.  It is thus not clear
from these studies to which extent the estimated net employment losses
associated with a general reduction in working time are related to the wage
adjustment rule, for example.  Furthermore, these studies do not differentiate
between skill groups and thus cannot account for the potential mismatch
between the demand for labor and the unemployment pool which is mostly
composed of unskilled labor.
In our econometric model of general working-time reductions, which is set
out in section IV below, we take into account both the direct and indirect
employment effects of a policy of general working-time reductions.  In
particular, we decompose the estimated net effect of a reduction in weekly
working time (standard hours) into a direct effect, calculated for given wages,
and an indirect effect which takes into account the reduction in the demand for
labor due to an increase in real wages associated with working-time reductions
(“Lohnausgleich”).  The adjustment of wages to general working-time
reductions may depend on institutional regulations which are briefly described
in the next section.  This section also contains a description of the development
of working time, employment, and wages by skill type.
3A novel feature of our econometric model is that firms’ demand for labor is
differentiated by skill level.  As it turns out, estimated wage elasticities of labor
demand differ distinctly by skill level.  The indirect employment effects of
working-time reductions therefore also differ markedly between the three skill
groups considered here.  This has important implications concerning the net
employment effects of a general reduction in working-time, although the direct
effects of such a policy hardly differ between the different skill levels.  Since the
wage elasticity of the demand for labor is relatively high for unskilled workers,
a general reduction of standard hours has the strongest negative effect on the
demand for unskilled workers for whom unemployment is already very high in
Germany (see, e.g., Paqué 1999).  A general reduction in working hours would
therefore lead to a further deterioration of the employment prospects for this
group.  Hence, we conclude that a general working-time reduction is not an
appropriate policy measure for reducing unemployment in Germany.  Rather, by
increasing labor costs only employed insiders would profit from such a policy.
Thus, we conclude that a general working-time reduction is not an effective
labor market policy instrument.
4II.   Institutional and Empirical Background
To set the scene for the following econometric analysis, in this section we
briefly describe some institutional and empirical background relating to general
working-time reductions in West German manufacturing in the period 1978 to
1998.  In addition to changes in working-time regulations, we also describe
changes in actual working hours as well as the development of employment and
real wages by skill level.
Working-time regulations in Germany are mainly determined by collective
bargaining agreements.  Although there are also legal regulations concerning
standard working hours, these are typically dominated by regulations contained
in collective bargaining agreements, especially in the manufacturing sector
where the IG Metal – the union organizing employees in the metal
manufacturing and electrical engineering industries (the metalworkers union for
short) – plays a dominant role.  The IG Metal is organizing about 2.7 million
employees and its coverage of employment in this sector is even larger because
collective bargaining agreements are also extended to non-union members.  In
1978, the IG Metal initiated a campaign for a reduction in the work week to
below 40 hours and, after a lengthy strike, succeeded in this campaign in 1984.
The weekly working time in the metal manufacturing and electrical engineering
industries was cut to 38.5 hours in 1985.  Further working time reductions were
negotiated to be introduced in various steps: standard working time was reduced
to 37 hours in 1988, to 36 hours in 1993 and to 35 in 1995.  Other industries,
such as the printing industry and the chemical industry, also reduced standard
working hours in various steps.
These agreements resulted in a stepwise reduction of the average standard
working time in the whole manufacturing sector as shown in Figure 1.2  On
                                          
2 Although collective bargaining agreements concerning working time distinguish between
blue-collar and white collar workers, working-time reductions have virtually been
5average, standard working time decreased from 40.1 hours in 1978 to 36.4 hours
at the end of the nineties. At the beginning of the observation period, standard
hours varied little between industries in the manufacturing sector – the standard
deviation was just 0.2 hours.  In 1998, inter-industry differences in collectively
bargained working time have markedly increased, as indicated by a standard
deviation of 1.4 hours.
Figure 1: Development of average standard hours in West German manufacturing
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Previous general working time reductions were accompanied by increases in
hourly wages to prevent weekly or monthly wages to decline proportionally with
the number of standard hours.  This wage compensation policy, known as
“Lohnausgleich”, is typically considered an important component of collective
bargaining agreements on the union side.  In an empirical study for West
Germany, Franz and Smolny (1994) show that in some industries (metal
                                                                                                                            
identical for the two groups. In Figure 1 only average standard hours are therefore
shown.
6manufacturing and electric engineering) the reduction in working hours ceteris
paribus  increased real hourly wages significantly, thus providing evidence for
partial wage compensation.  Hunt (1999) also finds some evidence for partial
wage compensation in German manufacturing industries.
On the other hand, the stepwise reduction of working time in metal
manufacturing was accompanied by the introduction of more flexible working-
time arrangements in collective bargaining agreements.  In particular,
accompanying the working-time reduction to an average of 38.5 hours, in 1985
an agreement allowed actual hours for individual or groups of employees within
a firm to vary between 37 and 40 hours as long as working hours within the firm
reached 38.5 hours on average.  Furthermore, the possibility that individual
working time could be varied within limits by firms as long as an average of
38.5 weekly hours was reached within a two-months period was introduced.
The collective bargaining agreement in the metal manufacturing industry which
introduced the stepwise reduction of the standard working time to 37 hours per
week by 1990 with full wage compensation was accompanied by a further step
towards more flexible working-time arrangements.  In particular, the period
within which individual working time had to be balanced to reach average
standard hours was extended from 2 to 6 months.  Furthermore, individual
working time could be differentiated between skill groups.  These regulations
were implemented at the firm level and specified in agreements between
management and work councils.  While more flexible working-time
arrangements were widely adopted in large firms, they were hardly used by
small firms.
The introduction of more flexible working-time arrangements in collective
bargaining agreements affected average hours actually worked differently for
various skill groups.  Between 1974 and 1998, weekly paid working hours
declined from 41.3 to 37.9 for unskilled and from 42.9 to 38.1 for skilled
workers, respectively.  In contrast, average paid hours worked by graduates
7increased from 41.8 to 42.1 per week in the period 1975 to 1996.3  In the same
period, weekly paid overtime hours in manufacturing declined from 2.1 to 1.1
hours for unskilled workers and from 3.3 to 1.6 hours for skilled workers.  For
graduates, overtime hours increased within the observation period.
How did the level of employment evolve over time?  Total employment in
West German manufacturing declined strongly from 8.3 to 6.3 million in the
period 1978  to 1998.  At the same time, the skill composition of employment
changed markedly.  To illustrate this, we have disaggregated employment into
three skill groups according to an employee’s highest educational or vocational
degree.  The three skill groups are
(i) unskilled workers:  without a completed educational or vocational degree,
(ii) medium skilled workers:  with a completed educational or vocational
degree, typically apprenticeship training
(iii) highly skilled workers:  graduates from a polytechnic (“Fachhochschule”)
or university.
The share of unskilled workers in West German manufacturing dropped from
about 45% in 1978 to less than 30% in 1998, whereas in this period the share of
skilled workers increased from about 52 to 65 percent and the share of highly
skilled workers increased from about 3% to more than 7% (see Figure 2).  The
long-term decline of employment in the West German manufacturing sector is
thus mainly related to the strong employment decline of unskilled labor.
                                          
3 Average weekly working hours for highly skilled workers are taken from the Labor
Force Survey (Mikrozensus) and their definition is  therefore not fully compatible with
the one used for unskilled and skilled workers which are obtained from a different data
source (see the appendix).  However, changes in average working hours for unskilled and
skilled workers as obtained from the Labor Force Survey are very similar to the
corresponding changes as obtained from the statistics of the Federal Statistical Office.
8Figure 2:  Development of the skill structure in West German manufacturing
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How have wage costs for the three skill groups developed over time?  To get a
measure for the costs of employing labor by skill groups we use real labor costs
including employers’ social security contributions as described in the data
appendix.  As Figure 3 shows, real labor costs have increased most for highly
skilled employees and least for unskilled workers.  However, the difference in
the increase of labor costs between unskilled and median skilled workers is
relatively small and occurred mainly in the second half of the nineties.
9Figure 3:  Development of real labor costs by skill group in West German
manufacturing
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To sum up, the following picture emerges from the preceding discussion.
Despite a relatively strong reduction of standard working hours since the late
eighties, employment of unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector declined
sharply.  The reduction in standard working hours was accompanied by the
introduction of more flexible working-time arrangements.  This seems to have
prevented paid weekly working hours to decline in proportion to the reduction of
standard working hours.  In particular, weekly paid working hours for highly
skilled labor even increased in this period.  Labor costs of highly skilled labor
increased faster than for unskilled and medium skilled labor, but there was little
change in relative wages between the latter two groups.
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III.  Direct and Indirect Employment Effects of
Working-Time Reductions
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the employment effects of
general working-time reductions focusing on various channels by which such
reductions may be transmitted into employment changes.4  Most of the
theoretical models focus on the demand side of the labor market and implicitly
assume that wages are given.  Furthermore, it is typically assumed that labor is
homogeneous.  To start with, we will also make these assumptions and present a
simple model due to Calmfors and Hoel (1988) which sheds some light on the
substitution between workers and hours in firms’ production decisions.
Assume that the firm's technology is given by the production function Y =
F(L, K), where Y denotes output, L denotes labor and K is the capital stock. F(×)
is a well-behaved concave production function.  The amount of labor input is
determined by the number of workers N and the amount of actual hours worked
h according to the following assumed functional relationship: L = G(h)´N.  The
function G(×), which is assumed increasing and concave in actual working hours
over the relevant interval, transforms working hours into efficiency labor units,
where workers’ productivity depend upon the number of hours worked.  This
functional form assumption implies that output increases at a decreasing rate
when employees work longer hours.  Labor costs per worker are given by the
following schedule:
                        
                                            if
( )    
W c wh h hs
W c wh w h h h hs sa
= + £
= + + - >
(1)
where c denotes person-specific fixed costs, w is the regular hourly wage, a  is
the overtime premium, and h and hs stand for actual and standard working hours,
                                          
4 For general surveys see, e.g., Hart (1987), Hamermesh (1993), Contensou and Vranceanu
(2000).
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respectively.  Firms maximize profits at given wages, fixed costs, the fixed
overtime premium and standard working hours by varying the level of
employment, actual working hours and the level of output.
The employment effect of a reduction in standard hours depends on whether
or not the firm has been working overtime hours before the policy change.  First,
assume the firm has initially been in an equilibrium where costs are minimized
at given output and the firm’s employees work overtime, i.e. h* > hs.  In this
case, marginal costs for, respectively, hiring an additional worker, NMC , and for
changing the number of actual hours of already employed workers, *hMC , are
given by
and
*
*( )
(1 )
N s
h
MC c wh w h h
MC wN
a
a
= + + -
= +
(2)
According to formula (2), marginal costs of working overtime do not depend on
standard hours and are therefore not affected by the policy change, whereas a
reduction of standard hours increases the marginal costs of hiring an additional
worker.  Because of the assumed properties of the production function
mentioned above, this will also result in an employment decline and in an
increase in the number of overtime hours.  In other words, cost-minimizing
firms working overtime in the initial equilibrium will substitute hours for
workers to adjust to the reduction in standard hours.  Furthermore, an increase in
the costs of employing workers will induce firms to substitute labor by capital
leading to a further decline in the demand for labor.
In case the firm worked standard hours in the initial situation, i.e. h* = hs,
the effect of a reduction in standard hours on the level of employment depends
on the nature of the new equilibrium.  If it is still optimal for the firm to choose
standard hours after the policy change, employment will increase.  In case the
firm chooses overtime after the reduction of standard hours, the employment
12
effect is ambiguous.  Finally, employment will not be affected by the reduction
of standard hours if the firm’s cost-minimizing choice of actual hours was less
than the number of standard hours before the policy change and if it is still
optimal to work less than standard hours after the policy change.  In case the
new optimum is shifted to the corner solution where h* = hs,, or if it even
becomes optimal for the firm to choose overtime hours, employment may either
rise or fall.
Depending on a firm’s particular situation before and after a reduction of
standard working hours, costs to the firm may increase or remain constant.  If
firms chose overtime hours in the initial equilibrium, a reduction in standard
hours will increase labor costs.  This implication of the model, however,
depends on the assumption of the overtime premium remaining constant.  If the
premium is increasing in the number of overtime hours, marginal costs of
working overtime are increasing as well and, according to equation (2), the
employment effect of a reduction in working hours becomes ambiguous even if
the other conditions mentioned above hold.  Given leisure is a normal good, the
overtime premium seems likely to be increasing in overtime hours.
So far, we have assumed that (hourly) wages for standard hours are not
affected by a reduction in standard hours.  The model therefore only shows the
direct employment effect of a reduction in standard hours.  However, given
some bargaining power on the side of workers or their unions, hourly wages are
likely to adjust at least partially to the reduction in standard hours in order to
prevent earnings to decline proportionally.  As mentioned in the previous
section, wage compensation (“Lohnausgleich”) has been an important factor in
collective bargaining agreements concerning working-time reductions in
Germany.  Of course, unions can only bargain over expected real wages.  Hence,
to which extent wage compensation actually occurs will depend on the
development of consumer prices and is thus an empirical question.
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Assuming the real hourly wage depend on standard hours, i.e. ( )sw w h= , the
change in the demand for labor of profit maximizing firms is given by
s s s
dN N N dw
dh h w dh
¶ ¶= +
¶ ¶
(3)
where / sN h¶ ¶  and /N w¶ ¶  denote the partial derivatives of the demand for
labor with respect to standard hours and wages, respectively.  That is, the first
term on the right-hand side of equation (3) is derived for given wages.
Multiplying both sides of equation (3) by /sh N  and expanding the last term of
the resulting expression by w , we obtain the following elasticity formula:
|s s sNwNh Nh w wh
e e e e= + (4)
where
sNh
e  is the total elasticity of labor demand with respect to standard hours,
|sNh w
e  is the partial elasticity of labor demand with respect to standard hours,
given the real hourly wage, Nwe  is the wage elasticity of labor demand and swhe
is the elasticity of the real hourly wage with respect to standard hours.
Whereas cost minimization implies that Nwe  is negative, the other two
elasticities on the right-hand side of equation (4), cannot be signed
unambiguously.  According to the discussion above, the direct effect of a
reduction in standard hours, given by the first term on the right-hand side of
equation (4), may have either sign.  The same holds true for the wage effects of
a reduction in standard hours, i.e. the sign of 
swh
e .  In the framework of a wage
bargaining model, Calmfors (1985) has shown that this elasticity can only be
signed for very special cases and will also depend on the union members’
preferences for leisure.  Of course, to the extent that leisure is a normal good and
the union acts in the interest of its members wages will have to adjust less than
proportionally to the reduction of working hours.  This will also depend on
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whether or not employers work their desired number of hours in the initial
situation (see Freeman, 1998).  In a different setting, Marimon and Zilibotti
(2000) also find that the wage and hence employment effects of working-time
reductions depend on individual preferences.  In their model, small reductions in
working-time increase equilibrium employment, whereas larger reductions in
working time reduce employment.
The impact of a reduction in working hours on employment is thus
theoretically ambiguous and remains an empirical question.  As mentioned in
the previous section, there is some evidence for partial wage compensation
(“Lohnausgleich”) in German manufacturing industries.  Combined with the
negative wage elasticity of the demand for labor, these results imply that the
indirect employment effect of a reduction in standard hours is negative.
The analysis in this section refers to a very simplistic production structure,
especially with respect to the assumption of homogeneous labor. If we consider
different skill groups, the above analysis becomes much more complex and the
likelihood of positive employment effects of general working-time reductions
even more unlikely.  Besides the possibility of substituting between the number
of employees, overtime hours and capital, a reduction in working hours may
lead to various demand-side effects concerning different skill groups. For
example, firms may choose more capital intensive production as a response to
reductions in standard hours.  This is likely to affect skilled and unskilled
workers differently because capital may be complementary with the former and
a substitute for the latter.  We take this into consideration in the following
specification of our econometric model.
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IV.   Demand Model for Heterogeneous Labor
To estimate the demand-side effects of a reduction in standard hours we specify
an econometric model of the demand for heterogeneous labor.  As mentioned
above, the employment effects of a policy of hours reductions are likely to differ
by skill for two reasons.  First, the direct effect (holding wages constant) may
differ because of differences in the possibility to substitute hours for workers
across skill groups.  Second, the indirect effect of a general working time
reduction related to wage compensation may also differ between skill groups
because the wage elasticity of labor demand is likely to differ by skill groups as
well.  Both the direct effect of a general reduction in standard hours and the
wage elasticity of labor demand by skill group can be estimated on the basis of
the econometric model specified here.  The estimation of the adjustment of
wages to a reduction in standard hours, which together with the wage elasticity
of labor demand, determines the indirect effect of a working-time reduction is
discussed in section V below.
IV.1  Econometric Specification
Our econometric model of the demand for heterogeneous labor is based on the
assumption of cost-minimizing firms and a flexible specification of the cost
function.  Given the specification of the technology of an industry, conditional
labor demand functions can be derived by using some standard results on the
duality between production and costs as follows (see, e.g., Varian 1992, chapter
4).  Let yr = yr(xv, xf, t) denote the industry production function which shows
how real output yr depends on a vector of variable inputs xv, a factor of quasi-
fixed inputs xf , and a time index t representing the state of technology.  For
reasons of data availability, we have to ignore intermediate goods and use value
added as the output variable in the production function.  We have therefore to
assume that intermediate goods are separable from the other inputs in the
production function.  Variable inputs are the three skill groups defined above,
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whereas the capital stock and standard hours are treated as quasi-fixed inputs.
We will assume that variable inputs can be fully adjusted within a year whereas,
due to costs of adjustment, quasi-fixed inputs are not always at their long-run
optimal level.  As regards standard working hours, although they are fixed for
all firms covered by a collective bargaining agreement, they can be adjusted for
the industry as a whole on the basis of a new collective bargaining agreement.
If the production function satisfies certain regularity conditions, and if firms
minimize variable costs vwx , where w denotes the vector of exogeneously given
wages of the three skill groups, there exists a restricted cost function given by
( ), , ,frC C w y x t= (5)
This restricted cost function is dual to the production function and contains all
economically relevant information on the production technology prevailing in a
particular firm or industry. To qualify as a proper restricted cost function, C
must be homogeneous of degree one, non-decreasing as well as concave in w,
non-decreasing in yr, and non-increasing and convex in the quasi-fixed factors of
production, xf.
For a given output level and exogenously given factor prices the cost-
minimizing demand for labor input i can be derived according to Shepards’s
Lemma by differentiating the restricted cost function with respect to this factor
(see, e.g., Varian, 1992: 74):
( , , , )frv
i
i
C w y x tx
w
¶=
¶
, for all i Î {1, 2, 3} (6)
The derived factor demand equations are homogeneous of degree zero in all
input prices and non-increasing in own input prices.  The factor demand
equations also imply certain symmetry restrictions which must be fulfilled for
the cost function to provide an economically meaningful description of
technology.  These restrictions can be tested, and if not rejected by the data,
imposed on the estimated system of factor demand equations.
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To estimate the factor demand system given by equation (6), a functional
form of the restricted cost function has to be specified.  A popular specification
of the production technology is based on the so-called generalized Leontief cost
function (see, e.g., Berndt 1991, chapter 9).  The great advantage of this cost
function is that it puts only rather general regularity conditions on the functional
form of the cost function and nevertheless implies a system of linear demand
equations which is relatively easy to estimate.5  However, we will also assume
that the cost function is homothetic and homogeneous of order one in the level
of output implying constant returns to scale in production.6  This assumption has
the advantage of considerably simplifying the estimation of the labor demand
equations by reducing the number of parameters to be estimated because all
interaction terms between output and all other variables of the cost function drop
out.
                                          
5 As the translog cost function, which is the most popular alternative econometric
specification for the estimation of multi-factor demand equations, the Diewert cost
function can be derived as a second-order linear approximization of an arbitrary function
with continuous first and second order derivatives which is homogenous in prices, non-
decreasing in input prices and non-decreasing in real output (see, e.g., Varian, 1992:
84f.).
6 A cost function is homothetic if it can be written as a positive monotonic transformation
of a function that is homogeneous of degree one (see, e.g., Varian, 1992: 482).  For
example, the cost function C(p,y) = ya´ g(p), where g is a function of the input prices, p,
y is output and a is the elasticity parameter, is homothetic if g is homogeneous of degree
one in prices and a > 0.
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Formally, the cost function used here is given by
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1/2
, , ,1 1 1 1
2
1 2, ,
1 1
, , , ,
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(7)
where C  = real total variable costs
yr = real value-added
f
jx = quasi-fixed factors (j = 1: standard weekly working hours
                                            j = 2: real capital stock), m = 2
jw = wage of skill group { }, ,j US MS HSÎ , n = 3
US = unskilled
MS = medium skilled
HS = high skilled
s = sector (s = 1, 2 ... 27)
t = time period t (t = 1978 ... 1995)
ij
ij
ik
b
g
d
üï
ý
ïþ
= unknown parameters
The time trend, which is used as a proxy for technological change, enters the
cost function with a linear and a quadratic term interacted with the wages of the
three skill groups.  Thus, the effects of (non-neutral) technological change on
labor demand may differ by skill level.  In the estimation of the model, the
manufacturing sector is disaggregated into 27 sectors (industries) denoted by s.
For data-related reasons (see the appendix), four of the 31 industries comprising
the German manufacturing sector had to be excluded from the analysis.  The
available data for West Germany cover the period 1974 to 1998.  However, for
estimation purposes we can only use years 1978-1995 for which the number of
employees and the net capital stock are available..
Applying Shephard’s lemma to the above cost function, the following
conditional (with respect to output and the quasi-fixed factors) demand
equations for the variable labor inputs ixn , i=US, MS, HS, can be derived
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Dividing these factor demands by real value added yields a system of input-
output coefficients of the following form:
( ) ( ) ( )1/ 2 2, , ,
1 1,
1 2/
v n m
fi
ij j i ij js t s t s t
j js t
i i ir w w x
x
t t
y
b g d dp
= =
æ ö
º =ç ÷
è ø
+ + ´ + ´å å (9)
The specification of the labor demand equations in terms of input coefficients
avoids multicollinearity problems between value added and the capital stock,
which typically plague the estimation of labor demand equations including both
separately as explanatory variables.
There are 486 (s ´ T = 27 ´ 18) observations for each of these three
equations.  In principle, consistent parameter estimates could be obtained by
estimating each equation separately.  However, there are cross-equation
restrictions implied by the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions mentioned
above (see, e.g., Berndt 1991: 461ff.).  For the following reasons, these
restrictions should be imposed in the estimation.  On the one hand, estimated
parameters in the system of equations have to fulfill these restrictions if they are
to be interpreted as structural parameters of the assumed cost function.  On the
other hand, the imposition of these restrictions may considerably increase the
efficiency of estimation.  These restrictions can be imposed by estimating the
equations in (9) by a system estimator (see, e.g., Greene 1997, chapter 17).
On the basis of the estimated coefficients from this system of demand
equations, own-price and cross-price elasticities for the various skill groups can
be calculated according to the following formulas (where a hat „^“ above a
parameter denotes an estimate):
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own-price elasticities
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, , ,i j US MS HS=
cross-price elasticities
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As formulas (10) and (11) show, own-price and cross-wage elasticities depend
on the structural parameters of the cost function, on relative wages and the
estimated input-output coefficients for the various skill groups as well as on the
industrial sector s and on the time index t.  Hence, these elasticities vary both
between and within industries.
IV.2   Estimation Results
In a first step, the system of labor demand equations in (9) was estimated in
levels of the dependent and independent variables.  To control for fixed
unobserved industry effects in the estimation of the system of equations (9),we
included 21 industry dummy variables.7  The system of labor demand equations
was estimated by the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with all
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions imposed.  As shown by the very low
value of the Durbin-Watson (DW) test statistic, this static specification of the
labor demand system generated a very high degree of serial correlation in all
equations.  Assuming a first-order autoregressive process (AR(1)-process), we
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tried to correct for autocorrelation (see, e.g., Berndt 1991: 476ff).  This
procedure yielded AR(1)-coefficients close to one in each of the three equations.
Given this extremely high autocorrelation in the levels equations, it seems more
appropriate to estimate the equation system (9) in first differences.  Thereby the
industry dummies drop out and the system of estimating equations simplifies to:
( ) ( ) ( )1/ 2 , ,, ,, 11 2 1 /
m f
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i ij j ii i
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where . ,i s tu  is an additive error term with the following assumed distribution:
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Estimation results for the system of equations in (12) with all homogeneity and
symmetry restrictions imposed are reported in Table 1.  In specification I, the
estimated coefficients 13b and 23b , which refer to relative wages of unskilled to
high skilled and of medium skilled to high skilled labor, respectively, turned out
to be statistically insignificant.  Estimation results for specification II with these
insignificant coefficients restricted to zero show that estimated coefficients of
the other variables differ little between the two specifications.
At least for the relationship between the unskilled and high skilled labor the
result that these groups are not substitutes in production seems plausible.
According to our estimates this also holds between medium skilled and high
skilled labor. In the following, own-price and cross-price elasticities are
therefore only reported for specification II.
                                                                                                                            
7 For i  = j, the first term on the right-hand side in each of the equations in (9) collapses to
a constant. In the estimation we assume that these may differ between industries and may
be treated as fixed industry effects.
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Table 1: Estimation results for the labor demand system (12)–  SUR-estimation
specification I specification II
coeff. t-value coeff. t-value
d11 –0.138 –3.89 –0.138 –3.89
d12 –0.007 –1.76 –0.007 –1.76
b12 1.877 1.67 1.838 1.72
b13 0.025 0.09 – –
g11 0.026 0.48 0.026 0.49
g12 0.033 2.31 0.033 2.31
d21 0.054 1.12 0.053 1.10
d22 –0.005 –1.03 –0.005 –1.01
b23 –0.179 –0.67 – –
g21 0.090 1.22 0.092 1.24
g22 0.046 2.38 0.046 2.38
d31 0.007 2.12 0.008 2.46
d32 0.000 1.12 0.000 1.08
g31 0.006 1.06 0.005 1.04
g32 0.005 3.50 0.005 3.70
Total number of observations
US-equation
Number of observations
R2
DW
MS-equation
Number of observations
R2
DW
HS-equation
Number of observations
R2
DW
1.296
432
0.98
1.76
432
0.92
2.26
432
0.98
2.20
1.296
432
0.98
1.76
432
0.91
2.26
432
0.98
2.19
Notes:  estimation period 1980 – 1995, West German manufacturing sector except oil
refining, tobacco, aircraft, computers and office machinery (see the data appendix); R2 refer to
the levels of the variables.
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Estimated coefficients on standard hours ( 11 21 31, ,g g g ) are positive but
insignificant (at the 10% level) in all three equations.  This implies that changes
in standard hours have no significant effects on the demand for the various skill
groups.  A positive coefficient would imply that the demand for the respective
skill group, given relative wages, output and the capital stock, is reduced by a
reduction in standard hours.  As discussed in section 2 above, such an effect is
theoretically possible but empirically not very likely.
The indirect effect of a reduction in standard hours also depends on the
wage elasticity of labor demand.  In Table 2 estimated own-wage elasticities of
unskilled and (medium) skilled workers are reported.  As mentioned above, the
own-wage elasticity of high skilled labor is restricted to zero  This also implies
that the cross-wage elasticities between unskilled and skilled labor are (in
absolute value) identical to the respective own-wage elasticities, see equations
(11) and (12).
The average own-wage elasticity of unskilled workers in the whole
manufacturing sector is –0.23.8  However, there is substantial variation in
estimated elasticities between industries: for example, in the chemical industry
this elasticity is -0.43, whereas it is only -0.10 in the ceramic industry.  As
shown by the standard deviation of estimated elasticities within the observation
period, there is also substantial time variation of elasticities for unskilled
workers within industries.  For example, the standard deviation of this elasticity
is 0.13, but only 0.01 in the ceramics industry.  These differences are
presumably related to differences in the response of labor demand to the
business cycle at the industry level.
As expected, estimated own-wage elasticities for skilled workers are
markedly lower.  On average, the wage elasticity of the demand for skilled
workers is just –0.12.  Compared to the estimates for unskilled workers,
                                          
8 This is the simple mean calculated without weighing the elasticities by sector size.
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estimated elasticities for skilled workers also vary little between industries and
over time.
There are few other studies which estimate the demand for heterogeneous
labor in West German manufacturing.  On the basis of a different specification
of the cost function but a similar data set, Falk and Koebel (1999) also obtain
comparable estimates of own-price elasticities of unskilled and skilled labor.
Furthermore, Falk and Koebel (1999) also estimated insignificant own-wage
elasticities for highly skilled labor.  Qualitatively, our elasticity estimates are
compatible with a large international literature, surveyed in Hamermesh (1993),
which shows that there is a clear hierarchy of own-wage elasticities of the
demand for heterogenous labor with the wage elasticity for unskilled labor being
the highest and for highly skilled labor the lowest.
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Table 2: Estimated own-wage elasticities in West German manufacturing industries
Unskilled Medium skilled
Industry e s e s
Chemical Products –0.43 0.13 –0.13 0.01
Sythetic materials –0.18 0.03 –0.12 0.01
Rubber products –0.18 0.03 –0.14 0.01
Stone and clay –0.32 0.06 –0.15 0.01
Ceramics –0.10 0.01 –0.11 0.01
Glass –0.19 0.05 –0.13 0.01
Iron –0.20 0.06 –0.11 0.01
Nonferrous metals –0.21 0.07 –0.12 0.02
Foundries –0.17 0.01 –0.14 0.01
Fabricated metals –0.21 0.04 –0.13 0.01
Steel, light metals –0.37 0.06 –0.09 0.01
Machinery –0.35 0.05 –0.09 0.01
Vehicles and repairs –0.27 0.05 –0.11 0.01
Shipbuilding –0.35 0.11 –0.07 0.01
Electrical appliances and repair –0.25 0.07 –0.12 0.01
Precision and optical instruments –0.24 0.05 –0.09 0.00
Metal products –0.18 0.03 –0.11 0.00
Musical instruments, toys, jewelry –0.26 0.05 –0.14 0.01
Woodwork –0.16 0.05 –0.14 0.02
Woodprocessing –0.20 0.02 –0.10 0.01
Fibres, paper production –0.24 0.06 –0.15 0.01
Paper processing –0.20 0.04 –0.14 0.01
Printing and publishing –0.33 0.04 –0.09 0.00
Leather –0.10 0.02 –0.10 0.01
Textiles –0.12 0.02 –0.11 0.00
Clothing –0.13 0.03 –0.08 0.01
Food, beverages –0.27 0.02 –0.12 0.01
Average manufacturing –0.23 0.09 –0.12 0.02
Notes: e  = mean of estimated elasticity within a particular industry, s = standard deviation of
estimated elasticities within the observation period.  The manufacturing sector does not
include oil refining, the tabbaco industry and aircraft manufacturing here.
Source:  Estimation results in Table 1.
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V.   Wage Adjustments to Reductions in Standard Hours
According to the elasticity formula (4) derived above, we require an estimate for
the elasticity of wages with respect to a change in standard hours in order to
decompose the total employment effect of a working-time reduction.  In this
section, we estimate this elasticity for the three skill groups on the basis of
reduced-form wage equations.  Estimation is based on the following system of
equations:
(14)
, , 0, , ,1 , , ,2 , , 1 ,1 , , ,2 , ,log( ) log( ) log( )
s s
i s t i s i i s t i i s t i i s t i t i s tw h h q Ua b b g g u-D = + D + D + D + +
where , , , , ,/
r v
i s t s t i s tq y xº  is the level of productivity of skill group i in industry s in
period t, U is the average level of unemployment, 0, ,i sa  is an industry fixed
effect and u  is an iid error term assumed uncorrelated with both 0, ,i sa  and the
explanatory variables in equations (14); the other symbols have already been
defined above.
The lagged hours term in (14) accounts for the sluggish adjustment of real
wages to changes in standard hours.  Whereas the effect of a change in standard
hours on the employment of a particular skill group within a year, i.e. the short-
term effect, is given by the respective b1-coefficient, the long-term effect is
given by the sum of b1 and b2.  Apart from the inclusion of the contemporaneous
and the one-period lagged change in standard hours, the specification in (14) is
equivalent to the standard specification of a long-term Phillips equation with the
restriction that the coefficient on the price term equals one,  i.e. the growth rate
or real wages depends positively on the growth rate of labor productivity and
negatively on the aggregate (log) unemployment rate.
SUR estimation results of the system of equations (14) are reported in
Table 3.  According to our estimates, a reduction of standard hours has a
significant positive effect on the real wage for each of the three skill groups .
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The sum of the estimated b1 and the b2 coefficients, i.e. the long-term elasticity
of real wages with respect to standard hours, is –0.017 for unskilled and medium
skilled workers and –0.022 for high skilled employees.  The size of the latter
coefficient, for example, implies that for high skilled workers a general
working-time reduction by one hour would result in an increase of the real
hourly wage by about 2%.  In terms of elasticities our estimates yield values of
–0.66 for unskilled and medium skilled workers, and –0.85 for high skilled
employees.9
Table 3: Estimation results for the wage adjustment equation by skill group
US MS HS
Variable coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value
constant 0.050 3.03 0.042 2.59 0.042 2.63
shD –0.010 –1.90 –0.010 –1.87 –0.017 –3.37
1
sh-D –0.007 –1.27 –0.007 –1.31 –0.005 –9.42
( )log qD 0.285 9.02 0.279 8.89 0.286 9.42
( )log U –0.019 –2.34 –0.015 –1.89 –0.013 –1.72
# observations 506 506 506
DW 1.82 1.83 1.87
2R 0.96 0.96 0.96
c2 (p-value) 6.16 (0.013) 6.18 (0.012) 11.16 (0.001)
Notes: Estimation period is 1979-1995; estimation is by Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR); sector dummies and a constant term are included in each equation; the c2 test refers to
a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of shD and 1
sh-D  are jointly zero, the
values given in parentheses are the respective p-values for this hypothesis.
                                          
9 Given that the average number of standard hours in manufacturing was 38.8 in the
observation period, a  reduction of standard hours by one hour per week means a
reduction in working-time by 2.58%.  The coefficient of 0.022 estimated for the high
skilled, for example, thus implies an elasticity of 0.85 (=2.2/2.58).
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In a recent study, Hunt (1999) reports estimated average wage elasticities with
respect to standard hours between 2 and 2.4%, depending on the particular
sector analyzed but without distinguishing between skill groups.  Franz and
Smolny (1994) also report negative effects of a general reduction in working
time on wages, also without distinguishing between skill groups.  Their
estimated effects vary across industry but, on average, are of similar size as the
ones obtained here.
VI.   Total Employment Effects of Working-Time Reductions
On the basis of the estimated elasticities obtained in the previous two sections,
we can now calculate the total employment effect of a general working-time
reduction according to formula (4) in section III.  According to our estimates,
for given real hourly wages the direct employment effect of a working-time
reduction, |sNh we , is insignificant for all three skill groups. However, there is an
indirect effect for workers for whom both the wage elasticity of labor demand,
Nwe , and the elasticity of the wage with respect to standard hours, swhe , are
significantly different from zero.  This indirect effect is zero for highly skilled
workers, because for them the estimated wage elasticity of labor demand is
insignificant.  Since for the other two skill groups both elasticities are negative
and significantly different from zero, the indirect effect is positive and
significant.  Thus, a reduction in standard hours reduces employment of
unskilled and skilled workers.  These effects are summarized in the following
table.
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Table 4: Employment effects of a working-time reduction by one hour in
manufacturing
Skill group Employees
(in 1000)
Employment loss
          in %           in persons
US 1,707 0.43 7,336
MS 4,376 0.19 8,271
HS 443 0 0
Sum 6,526 15,606
Notes:  There is no direct employment effect because the estimated elasticity of labor demand
with respect to standard hours is insignificant for all skill groups.  Indirect employment
effects are calculated from wage estimated average elasticities of labor demand ( Nwe ) for
unskilled and skilled workers within each industry as  given in Table 2. Data on the level of
employment by skill group refer to the year 1998 and are from the Federal Labor Office.
According to our estimates, a reduction in standard working-time by one hour
would result in an employment decline in West German manufacturing by about
15,600 jobs.  This number corresponds to roughly 0.25% of all jobs in the
manufacturing sector.  Proportionally, the employment decline among unskilled
workers is stronger than among skilled workers because of the higher wage
elasticity of labor demand estimated for unskilled workers.  Given that the
demand for highly skilled workers is completely inelastic, employment for this
group is not affected by a reduction in standard hours despite the relatively
strong wage effect of a reduction in standard hours estimated for this group.
These calculations are based on elasticities estimated from data for the
period 1978 to 1995 and on the assumption that both the underlying
technological relationships and the wage bargaining system remains unchanged
in the future, in particular following a working-time reduction.  This assumption
is the less likely to hold the more standard working time is reduced.  The metal
workers union (IG Metall) has been suggesting a reduction of standard working
hours from currently 35 in this sector to 32 hours per week.  Given that our
estimated elasticities can also be applied to this relatively large change, we
would expect that such a policy, if applied to the whole manufacturing sector,
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would reduce employment by about 50 thousand people.  If only applied to the
metal manufacturing and electrical engineering industry, which is covered by IG
Metall, the expected employment loss would be about 30 thousand people,
among them about 10 thousand unskilled and 20 thousand skilled workers.
VII.   Summary and Conclusion
There has been a strong long-term decline in standard working hours in West
German manufacturing, especially in the important metal manufacturing and
electrical engineering industry where standard working time has been reduced to
35 hours.  Nevertheless, a further working-time reduction to 32 hours has been
proposed by the metalworkers union (IG Metall) as a means to reduce the
persistently high level of unemployment prevailing in Germany.
However, the effects of general working-time reductions on unemployment
and employment are theoretically ambiguous.  We have shown that the net
employment effect of a working-time reduction depends on the distribution of
firms across the various working-time regimes before and after the policy
change and that the net effect is ambiguous even in the case of constant real
wages.  Taking into account wage increases due to the so-called wage
compensation rule (“Lohnausgleich”), which the unions typically try to include
in collective bargaining agreements in order to prevent weekly or monthly
earnings to decline in proportion to the reduction in standard working hours,
render positive employment effects of general working-time reductions even
more unlikely.  It thus comes as no surprise that most previous empirical studies
find no or even negative employment effects of general working-time reduction
in Germany.
In this study, we have extended previous empirical research on the
employment effects of working-time reductions in two important ways.  First,
we estimate both a structural labor demand model and a system of reduced-form
wage adjustment equations.  This provides a way to decompose the net
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employment effect of a reduction in standard hours into a direct effect, holding
wages constant, and an indirect effect also allowing for adjustments of hourly
wages to a reduction in standard hours.  Second, in contrast to most previous
research we distinguish between various skill groups, i.e. we estimate a labor
demand model for heterogeneous labor and also allow the degree of wage
compensation to differ by skill group.  Given that both the direct employment
effect of a reduction in standard hours and the wage elasticity of labor demand
are likely to differ between unskilled, medium skilled and highly skilled
workers, the employment effects of general working-time reductions by skill
group will differ as well.
For none of the three skill groups we could find a significant direct
employment effect of a reduction in standard hours.  That is, the positive and
negative direct employment effects of such a policy, discussed in the theoretical
section of the paper, seem to cancel each other.  However, there are significant
negative indirect employment effects, at least for unskilled and medium skilled
workers.  These negative effects were obtained from the estimated wage
elasticities of labor demand by skill group and the wage elasticity with respect to
a change in standard hours estimated from the system of wage adjustment
equations.  The average elasticities for the manufacturing sector as a whole are
estimated to be –0.25 and –0.11 for unskilled and skilled workers, respectively.
For highly skilled employees the wage elasticity was estimated to be
insignificant, implying that there is no significant indirect employment effect for
this group.  On the other hand, our estimation results show that the adjustment of
real wages to a reduction in standard working hours is quite similar across the
three groups:  a reduction by one hour increases real wages of unskilled and
skilled workers by 1.7%, compared to 2.2% for highly skilled labor.
Taken together, these elasticity estimates imply that a working-time
reduction will have negative net employment effects for unskilled and medium
skilled workers, and that this effect will be stronger for unskilled workers.  A
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general reduction of standard working time by one hour will lead to a reduction
of unskilled workers by about 0.4% and by 0.24% for skilled workers.  In
absolute numbers, this would imply an employment reduction in the West
German manufacturing sector of about 15,000 jobs.  Only highly skilled
employees would unambiguously gain by such a policy because their wages
would increase significantly without a significant reduction in the labor demand
for this group.  Among unskilled and medium skilled labor only those workers
lucky enough to keep or get a job will profit from the wage increase related to
the unions’ wage compensation policy.  This policy would thus strengthen the
position of insiders at the costs of outsiders in the labor market.  In view of these
results and the high unemployment rate of unskilled workers we conclude that a
general working-time reduction is not an effective tool of employment policy.
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Data Appendix
We combine data from various statistics of the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches
Bundesamt) and from the Federal Labor Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) as summarized in
Table 5 below.  All data refer to the West German manufacturing which comprises 31
industries at the two-digit level.  The oil refining, the tabbaco industry and aircraft
manufacturing (Luftfahrzeugbau) had to be excluded because value-added is not an adequate
output measure due to the very high level of commodity taxation and subsidies (for aircraft)
in these industries.  The computer and office machinery industry had to be excluded due to an
obvious (but unexplainable) break in the data series10  The data cover the period 1978 to
1998.  Since data on the capital stock are only available until 1995, the estimation period is
1978 to 1995.
Table 5: Employment effects of a working-time reduction by one hour in
manufacturing
Variable Statistics
Standard hours contained in
collective bargaining agreements
Amtliche Statistik der Tariflöhne und
Gehälter (Series Number. 16 R 4.3),
German Statistical Office
Average number of paid weekly
hours/overtime hours
Verdiensterhebung für das Produzierende
Gewerbe (Series Number. 16 2.1 – 2.3,
German Statistical Office)
Average paid hours/overtime
hours for white-collar workers
Mikrozensus (Labor Force Survey),
German Statistical Office
Employment by skill group Beschäftigtenstatitisik der Bundesanstalt
für Arbeit (Federal Labor Office)
Real value-added, product price
deflator, real capital stock
National Accounts (2-digit level); German
Statistical Office
Employment by skill group
The number of dependently employed persons by skill level and industry is based on the
employment statistics (“Beschäftigtenstatistik”) of the Federal Labor Office. This data source
provides data on all dependently employed people covered by the social security system.  In
the manufacturing sector this means almost complete coverage of workers.  The skill groups
                                          
10 According to data supplied by the Federal Labor Office employment of all three skill
groups declined by about 33% between 1992 and 1993, whereas real value-added only
decreased by 13%.
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are as defined in section II in the text.  The industry classification at the two-digit level in the
IABS can be matched to the one in the disaggregated National Accounts (see below).
Hours
Standard hours contained in collective bargaining agreements are contained in the official
statistics on contract wages of blue- and white-collar workers.  The average number of paid
weekly hours as well as overtime hours are taken from the official earnings statistics for blue-
and white-collar workers in the manufacturing sector.  Paid hours include effectively worked
hours plus paid non-working time due to sickness or holidays.  Overtime hours are defined as
working hours exceeding average hours worked by the firm which are not compensated by
time-off in some other period, irrespective of whether or not a premium is paid for overtime.
Since these statistics do not refer to white-collar workers, data on the number of average paid
weekly hours and overtime hours for highly skilled workers (graduates) were obtained for
various years from the Labor Force Survey.11
Earnings and labor costs by skill group
The earnings statistics of the Federal Statistical Office used here distinguishes skill level by
“performance groups” (Leistungsgruppen).12 As workers we consider all persons in dependent
employment who are subject to the insurance obligation in the workers' pension scheme . We
do not include part-time workers and trainees. There are three skill groups for blue-collar
workers and four such groups for white-collar workers.  We use two of the former and one of
the latter groups to represent the skill structure defined above.  For blue-collar workers, group
I refers to employees performing jobs which require a completed apprenticeship training of at
least three years, whereas group III refers to workers performing unskilled jobs.  White-collar
group II represents highly skilled workers who have a certain responsibility concerning the
management of other workers and/or administrative or technical tasks.  In our opinion, these
categories yield a satisfactory matching of performance groups as contained in the earnings
statistics and skill groups as defined above.
For blue-collar workers the gross hourly wage is available form the earnings statistics of
the Federal Statistical Office.  It includes all payments on a regular basis. Usually, this
                                          
11 Data from the Labor Force Survey were available to us for the years 1976, 1980, 1982,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995 and 1996.  We thank ZUMA Mannheim for
providing us with the calculations for the years 1976 to 1989.
12 We use this data base for earnings by skill group rather than the IABS because the median
earnings are censored in the latter data base as mentioned above.
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consists of the collectively bargained or individually agreed wage including regularly paid
fringe benefits.  These payments do not include employers’ social security contributions and
irregularly paid fringe benefits, in particular holiday and Christmas gratification.  For white-
collar workers, gross monthly earnings also include fringe benefits paid on a regular basis, but
excludes irregular payments.  Hourly gross wages were obtained by normalizing by average
weekly hours.
Labor costs per hour were obtained by adding employers’ social security contributions
obtained from the National Accounts which contain both the sum of gross earnings (wages
and salaries) which include employees’ contributions to social security and gross income from
dependent employment which also includes employers’ social security contributions.  The
ratio of these two series, which are available for each industry, gives employers’ social
security contributions as a share of gross earnings.  Labor costs per hour were obtained by
adding this percentage to the hourly gross wage.  To take into account the amount of fringe
benefits typically paid on an irregular basis, labor costs per hour were multiplied by the factor
13/12.  Real labor costs were obtained by normalizing nominal costs by an industry’s product
price deflator which was derived from the disaggregated National Accounts.
Real value-added, real capital stock
In addition to an industry’s product price deflator; the disaggregated National Accounts
provide data on real value-added and the real capital stock at the two-digit level. Gross value
added is calculated by subtracting the value of intermediate inputs from gross product.  The
net capital stock includes the stock of machinery and buildings adjusted for depriciation.
Gross value added and the net capital stock are measured at 1991 prices.
